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Abstract
Rational decisions depend on what players know, hence an appropriate epistemic
analysis is an integral element of the foundations of Game Theory. We suggest a
general logical approach for studying games which consists of formalizing rationality
and games in epistemic logic and deriving their properties in the resulting logical
system. We study a number of examples and demonstrate that our model can pro-
duce a finer-grained analysis of game-theoretical scenarios and provide a non-circular
justification of Nash equilibrium strategies.
We show that within this model, in strategic-form and extensive-form games, an
assumption of first-level mutual knowledge of the game and players’ rationality implies
Nash equilibrium and backward induction solutions. This refutes a general perception
that common knowledge of rationality is needed to justify backward induction in
games with perfect information.
1 Introduction
Making epistemic conditions in games explicit is a necessary part of game analysis and
recommendations. Without such disclosure, solutions offered by Game Theory would be
incomplete or even misleading. Game theorists have long been aware of this and have
studied sufficient epistemic conditions under which traditional game-theoretical solutions,
e.g., Nash equilibria, backward induction solutions, etc., hold (cf. [2, 3, 4, 5, 7] and many
others).
We believe that further steps in the epistemic analysis of games are needed: tracking
what players actually know and don’t know is as important as payoff and move-analysis.
Moreover, since rational decisions actually depend on what players know, an appropriate
epistemic analysis belongs to the foundations of Game Theory.
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A variety of methods have been offered to study epistemic questions in Game Theory.
We suggest our own rather general approach and argue that it provides, in certain situa-
tions, a finer-grained analysis. In particular, we consider Prisoner’s Dilemma (Section 3)
and War and Peace Dilemma (Section 4) with different states of knowledge of players’ ra-
tionality and analyze how the same set of preferences can lead to different behavior under
different epistemic conditions of players.
We show that first-level mutual knowledge of the game and players’ rationality (given
some plausible assumptions about players’ intelligence) implies Nash equilibrium and back-
ward induction solutions in both strategic-form games and extensive-form games with per-
fect information. This refines the classic Aumann’s Theorem that in games with perfect
information, common knowledge of rationality implies backward induction. As an example,
we derive the backward induction solution of the centipede game from first-level mutual
knowledge of the game and players’ rationality.
The approach we follow here is that of postulating epistemic principles about games in
a corresponding epistemic logic with rationality propositions, and studying the resulting
logical description. Applying epistemic modal logic in games is an established tradition
(cf., for example [5, 7, 8, 10, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20]). What we do differently here is assume
and formalize, to a larger extent, players’ ability to draw logical conclusions from the game
description and general understanding of rationality. We discuss and assume plausible
epistemic principles about games, strategies, and rationality (Assumptions 1 and 2) and
make them, together with the basic epistemic logics of belief K and knowledge T, the logical
foundation of the proposed model for games.
We pursue a two-step approach in building logical models of games. First, we specify
the problem by syntactic logical tools and then use whatever methods are appropriate to
study the resulting formal specification. Here are some obvious advantages to such an
approach:
- We do not lose the whole picture by committing upfront to a specific combinatorial
model, which is often not completely adequate. A verbally described problem may not have
a unique model at all. On the contrary, by first constructing a formal logic specification,
we invite a whole variety of models and deny none of them a priori.
- We have the advantage of yet another structure, logic formalization, which has its own
tools, including deduction methods, which are quite capable of handling epistemic tasks.
- Logic formalization in the middle helps to bridge the epistemic gap caused by the
fact that human agents do not necessarily think and communicate in combinatorial terms.
Agents announce sentences and logical conditions rather than specific set partitions, Kripke
models, topological spaces, etc.
2 Awareness and Rationality: logical view
We will focus on two epistemic issues which attract attention in Game Theory: knowledge
of rationality and knowledge of the game. Rationality is a property, whereas the game is
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an object, and ‘knowledge of the game’ should be understood as
awareness of the game rules (possible moves, payoffs, etc.).
For simplification purposes, we will assume here game awareness for all players:
each player is aware of the rules of the game.
When explicitely stated, we will also assume mutual knowledge of game awareness for all
players:
each player is aware of the rules of the game and this fact is known to each player.
Player P ’s rationality will be represented by a special atomic proposition
rP − ‘P is rational.’
Player P ’s knowledge (or belief) will be denoted by modality KP , hence
KP (F ) - ‘P knows (believes) that F .’
In particular, KP (rQ) states that ‘player P knows (believes) that player Q is rational.’
2.1 Knowledge and belief postulates
We assume that knowledge modalities KP satisfy postulates of the most general modal
logic of knowledge T:
Axioms and rules of classical logic;
KP (F → G) ∧KP (F )→ KP (G), epistemic closure principle;
KP (F )→ F, factivity;
Necessitation Rule: if F is derived without hypothesis, then KP (F ) is also derived.
(1)
In many cases, it is sufficient for epistemic analysis of a game to assume a yet weaker
system, namely K, which is T without the factivity principle. In this case, KP is considered
to be belief rather than knowledge modality.
2.2 Self-knowledge of rationality
We assume self-knowledge of rationality.
rP → KP (rP) (2)
as a new logical axiom in epistemic logic. This assumption basically reflects our under-
standing that rationality is a conscious state of mind and a rational agent realizes that he
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behaves rationally. We do not consider as rational a player who acts rationally by chance,
without conscious and consistent behavior.
Let
Krn
be the K-based logic of belief with n agents extended by additional axioms of self-knowledge
of rationality (2) for each agent.
The logic of knowledge
Trn
is defined in a similar manner based on T.
In both Krn and T
r
n, for any players Q1, Q2, . . . Qm,
KQ1KQ2 . . .KQm [rP → KP (rP)]
is derivable.
We will use KP,QX as shorthand for KP (X) ∧KQ(X).
2.3 Epistemic conditions of rational behavior
What sort of epistemic analysis could we anticipate within this language? What would be
regarded as epistemic conditions for a rational player P , who is aware of the rules of the
game, to play a given strategy?
Let player P have to choose one of the strategies 1, 2, . . . , n and si denote
P chooses i-th strategy.
In particular, the following holds:
s1 ∨ s2 ∨ . . . ∨ sn.
Moves by the players can be assumed as self-known:
si → KP (si) and ¬si → KP (¬si). (3)
Let also
best :si
denote the proposition
i-th strategy yields the highest payoff for P among all strategies available.
For simplicity, we assume that there is a unique highest-yield strategy for P among
1, 2, . . . , n. In particular, this condition is met in games with ordinal preferences.
It is clear that best :si alone is not sufficient for si since best :si may be unknown to P .
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Assumption 1 If player P is rational and P knows that a certain strategy does not yield
the highest payoff for P among all available strategies, then P does not choose this strategy.
Formally, for each i = 1, 2, . . . , n,
rP → [KP (¬best :si)→ ¬si]. (4)
We believe that this assumption is acceptable for game-theorists. A similar assumption
was made by Bonanno in [7]:
“...a player is irrational if she chooses a particular strategy while believing that
another strategy of hers is better.”
The following Corollary 1 is implied by (4) in basic epistemic logic and should be accepted
as soon as we accept Assumption 1.
Corollary 1 If player P is rational and P knows that a certain strategy is the only one
which yields the highest payoff for P among all available strategies, then P chooses this
strategy. Formally, for each i = 1, 2, . . . , n,
rP → [KP (best :si)→ si]. (5)
Proof. Pick an i from 1, 2, . . . , n and suppose rP and KP (best :si), i.e., that P knows that
i-th strategy yields the highest payoff. By assumptions, KP (¬best :sj) for all i, j such that
j 6= i. By Assumption 1 and epistemic logic, for all j such that j 6= i,
rP ∧KP (best :si) → ¬sj,
hence
rP ∧KP (best :si) → (¬s1 ∧ . . . ∧ ¬si−1 ∧ ¬si+1 ∧ . . . ∧ ¬sn).
Since
s1 ∨ s2 ∨ . . . ∨ sn,
we have
(¬s1 ∧ . . . ∧ ¬si−1 ∧ ¬si+1 ∧ . . . ∧ ¬sn) → si,
hence
rP ∧KP (best :si) → si.
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The following is an easy corollary of (3), (4), and (5).
Corollary 2 Under the conditions of Assumption 1, for each i = 1, 2, . . . , n,
rP → [KP (¬best :si)→ KP (¬si)] (6)
and
rP → [KP (best :si)→ KP (si)]. (7)
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2.4 Awareness Principle and its consequences
The following Awareness Principle represents the ability of player P to determine his best
pure strategy at a given node of the game from the rules of the game:
KP (best :s1) ∨ . . . ∨KP (best :sn), (8)
i.e.,
P knows his best strategy.
For finite perfect information games (of feasible size), the Awareness Principle looks
quite plausible, since game-aware intelligent players are perfectly capable of determining
which of the strategies yields the best payoff.
From the Awareness Principle, we can deduce Corollary 3 which demonstrates that if
a rational player P is completely aware of his options, plays pure strategies, and chooses a
strategy s, P then knows that s yields the highest guaranteed payoff among all available
strategies. This principle represents the drawing of conclusions about knowledge of rational
and well-informed players from their moves.
Corollary 3 In addition to conditions of Corollary 1, suppose Awareness Principle (8).
Then for each i = 1, 2, . . . , n,
rP → [si → KP (best :si)]. (9)
Proof. Choose i from 1, 2, . . . , n and suppose that rP and ¬KP (best : si). By Awareness
Principle (8), we have
KP (best :s1) ∨ . . . ∨KP (best :si−1) ∨KP (best :si+1) ∨ . . . ∨KP (best :sn).
By Corollary 1,
s1 ∨ . . . ∨ si−1 ∨ si+1 ∨ . . . ∨ sn.
Since P has to choose only one strategy,
(s1 ∨ . . . ∨ si−1 ∨ si+1 ∨ . . . ∨ sn) → ¬si,
therefore ¬si. So, we have assumed rP ∧ ¬KP (best :si) and concluded ¬si, hence
rP ∧ ¬KP (best :si) → ¬si
and
rP → [si → KP (best :si)].
2
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For one-shot strategic-form games, Awareness Principle (8) may be regarded as a ‘pure
strategy principle’: a player is knowingly evaluating available pure strategies and trying to
determine which is best. Since the set of choices is finite and known to the player together
with their payoffs, he can determine his best move. If player P does not know his best
strategy, he then chooses it by chance or plays a different, non-optimal strategy. Under the
circumstances, we can hardly consider P a rational player who is aware of the game rules
and knowingly plays his best pure strategy.
Principle (10) below manifests itself in such a common mode of reasoning about strategic-
form games as ‘drawing arrows’ on the preferences matrix from non-optimal outcomes to
better ones (cf. game matrices with such arrows in Sections 3 and 4). By doing this, we
rule out certain outcomes as non-rational for at least one player. For example, in Prisoner’s
Dilemma (Section 3), we reject the outcome
(cooperateA, defectB)
as not rational for A on the basis that
(defectA, defectB)
yields a higher payoff for A, given that B plays defectB.
This idea can be summarized as
bad strategies are never played by rational players.
Indeed, if a rational player P knows his best strategy, he will not choose a bad one. If
P does not know his best strategy, he cannot knowingly choose it, hence he cannot be
regarded a rational player who plays pure strategies.
In a formal logical setting, this amounts to the following Corollary 4 which can be easily
deduced from Corollary 3, as well as accepted as a separate assumption which reflects the
way game-theorists reason, e.g., about strategic-form games.
Corollary 4 Under conditions of Corollary 3, for each i = 1, 2, . . . , n,
rP → [¬best :si → ¬si]. (10)
Proof. By Corollary 3,
rP → [si → KP (best :si)].
By factivity of knowledge,
KP (best :si) → best :si.
Hence
rP → [si → best :si],
and
rP → [¬best :si → ¬si].
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2In Sections 4 and 5, we derive Nash equilibrium strategies of players from their mutual
knowledge of the game and rationality using Corollary 4 which is based on Awareness
Principle (8). This has foundational consequences for the problem of justifying players’
choice of Nash equilibrium strategies. Traditional Game Theory analysis admits that the
reasoning in defense of Nash equilibrium is circular (cf. [6], pp. 14–16), e.g.,
Alice plays this way because Bob plays this way,
Bob plays this way because Alice plays this way.
Our epistemic analysis severs this circularity and justifies Nash equilibrium choices by
accepting the Awareness Principle:
Alice and Bob play Nash equilibrium strategies because each of them believes that
the other player is game-aware, rational, and knowingly plays pure strategies
(hence knows his/her best strategy).
An alternative way of justifying Nash equilibrium is described in Section 5:
Alice and Bob play Nash equilibrium strategies because each of them believes
that the other player is game-aware, rational, and that at any other outcome,
at least one of the players would know that he had played irrationally.
2.5 Format of the logical model
We will be modeling game G with n players by an appropriate logical model which consists
of
1. an appropriate epistemic logic, e.g., Krn, T
r
n, etc. (Section 2.2);
2. a set of formulas RA called Rationality Assumptions;
3. a set of formulas GD which will constitute a partial Game Description.
We will consider RA’s which contain rationality propositions rP for each player P as
well as some mutual knowledge of rationality assertions KQ(rP). In particular, if mutual
knowledge of rationality is assumed, then RA contains KQ(rP)’s for all P and Q.
Game Description GD is usually a finite set of formulas which depends on a specific
game. Normally, GD contains some instances of principles (3)–(10), explicitly mentioned,
as well as other logical statements about the game.
The following comment requires a certain degree of familiarity with formal logic and
can be omitted at first reading.
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Within our logical model,
L = Epistemic Logic+ Rationality Assumptions+Game Description, (11)
the only default rule of inference is Modus Ponens
A A→ B
B
whereas the Necessitation Rule
A
KP (A)
can be used only within the scope of Epistemic Logic (with rationality propo-
sitions, e.g., Krn, T
r
n, etc.).
Epistemic Logic from L (11) enjoys the Deduction Theorem
Γ, A ` B iff Γ ` A→ B,
where ‘`’ stands for provability in a given epistemic logic system (e.g., Krn, Trn,
etc.), Γ is a set of formulas, and A, B are formulas. In particular,
L ` B iff Epistemic Logic ` [RA∧ GD] → B.
This observation helps to establish certain impossibility results concerning log-
ical models, e.g., in Theorems 1 and 2 below. In order to establish that some
sentence F is not derivable in a given L = Epistemic Logic+RA+GD it suffices
to demonstrate that
Epistemic Logic 6` [RA∧ GD] → F,
for which is suffices to find a Kripke model K for given Epistemic Logic such
that at one of its nodes, all formulas from RA and GD hold, but F does not
hold.
2.6 Some examples
Let us consider the simple example of a game in Figure 1, which we borrow from [2]. Player
P has two choices: to move down with payoff 1, or to move across with payoff 3. For the
sake of example, suppose there is one more player (observer), Q, who does not make moves
but is aware of the game rules and knows that P is rational and aware of the game rules.
Let a be the proposition
P chooses ‘across’
9
1•

P
3//
Figure 1: Game 1
and d be
P chooses ‘down.’
The following proposition is true about this game:
P chooses ‘across’ or ‘down’ but not both
or, in symbolic form,
(a∨d) ∧ ¬(a∧d). (12)
Moreover, justification of (12) does not require any special epistemic assumptions; it log-
ically follows from the game description and basic understanding of game awareness. On
these grounds, we assume that (12) is known to any intellectual player, in particular, P ,
who is aware of the game rules:
KP [(a∨d) ∧ ¬(a∧d)]. (13)
In addition, since Q knows that P is aware of the game rules,
KQKP [(a∨d) ∧ ¬(a∧d)]. (14)
Furthermore, from the rules of the game, it follows that
a yields the highest payoff for P ;
let us denote this proposition by
best :a . (15)
Naturally, (15) is known to anyone who is aware of the game rules, e.g.,
KP (best :a). (16)
Once again, if Q knows that P is aware of the game rules, then
KQKP (best :a). (17)
10
Now we can establish that if P is rational, then P should play across. Indeed, by (5),
rP → [KP (best :a)→ a], (18)
which, together with (16), gives
rP→ a.
If Q knows that P is aware of the game rules, then Q knows (18):
KQ[rP → (KP (best :a)→ a)]. (19)
By (17) and (19), it follows that
KQ(rP→ a).
Since Q knows that P is rational
KQ(rP),
Q knows that P should play across:
KQ(a). (20)
Adopting (13), (14), (16), (17), and (19) amounts to trusting that players P and Q are
capable of performing some logical analysis of the game and share general understanding
of game awareness and rationality.
To derive (20), we have used Rationality Assumption RA = {rP ,KQ(rP)}.
Game Description GD in this case consists of principles (12)–(19).
2.7 Applying intelligence
In this section we introduce more general principles which will be used to build Game
Descriptions; these assumptions seem all to be in line with the usual methods of reasoning
in Game Theory.
Assumption 2 i) If X is a formally stated proposition which logically follows (given as-
sumptions about state of the game) from the game description, then
X
can be added to the formal Game Description GD.
ii) If, in addition, P is aware of the game rules, then
KP (X)
can be added to GD.
iii) Moreover, if Q knows that P is aware of the game rules, then
KQKP (X)
can be added to GD.
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We justify Assumption 2 by semi-formal reasoning. Let GP be the proposition
P is aware of the game rules.
By the conditions, GP holds for each player P , and KQ(GP ) holds for any P and Q.
1. Since X logically follows from the game rules, X is true.
2. Since P is aware of the game rules, P knows every X that follows logically from the
game rules:
GP → KP (X). (21)
This yields
KP (X).
3. Q knows (21), since it is based on a general understanding of awareness and logical
entailment without any additional assumptions:
KQ[GP → KP (X)],
which yields
KQ(GP ) → KQKP (X).
4. If Q knows that P is aware of the game rules, KQ(GP ), then Q knows that P knows X,
i.e.,
KQKP (X).
Corollary 5 Suppose game awareness is mutually known. If any instance X from (3)–(10)
is adopted, then for any players P and Q,
X, KP (X), and KQKP (X) (22)
can be added to the formal Game Description GD.
By adopting Corollary 5, we assume that the epistemic principles of rational behavior
(3)–(10) are shared by all players and follow from the rules of the game. Specifically, in
addition to self-evident (3), this amounts to adopting Assumption 1 – which has already
been discussed in game-theotetical papers – and Awareness Principle (8), which has been
discussed in Section 2.4. We will indicate whether or not specific applications rely on
Awareness Principle (8).
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2.8 Applying rationality
We now apply Assumption 2 to sentences X containing rationality propositions.
Corollary 6 Suppose game awareness is mutually known. If Y logically follows from the
game description and rationality of P , then for each of players A and B, the following
sentences can be added to the Game Description GD:
(rP→ Y ), KA(rP→ Y ), KBKA(rP→ Y ). (23)
Proof. By Assumption 2 applied to rP→ Y as X. 2
Assumption 2 and Corollaries 5 and 6 use the unspecified notion ‘logically follows,’ which
will have a rather transparent meaning in specific applications considered below. This no-
tion, ‘logically follows,’ should be used with caution in order to avoid the well-known logical
omniscience defect of epistemic modal logic (cf. [9, 11, 13, 14]). In a specific application,
it should be clear that players can be realistically expected to draw the corresponding log-
ical conclusions. We believe that such assumptions are plausible in many game-theoretical
situations, e.g., the ones involving countries, corporations, intelligent players, etc.
3 Prisoner’s Dilemma
The well-known Prisoner’s Dilemma with two players, A and B, and two strategies for
each, cooperate or defect, has the matrix
cooperateB defectB
cooperateA 2,2 ⇒ 0,3
⇓ ⇓
defectA 3,0 ⇒ 1,1
Each player has a dominant strategy to defect, the only Nash equilibrium is
(defectA,defectB),
and we will study epistemic conditions under which A and B choose the strategies suggested
by the Nash equilibrium.
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Theorem 1 In Prisoner’s Dilemma, suppose game awareness is mutually known and both
players are rational. Then,
i) Each of the players knows that he has to play his Nash equilibrium strategy ‘defect.’
ii) None of the players necessarily knows that the other player should play ‘defect,’ nor
do players necessarily know their own eventual payoffs.
iii) If, in addition, rationality of players is mutually known, then it is mutually known
that both players should play their Nash equilibrium strategies, hence their eventual payoffs
are mutually known as well.
Proof. The logical description of Prisoner’s Dilemma will be based on epistemic modal
logic of belief Kr2 with two players A and B, and designated rationality propositions rA and
rB. We define propositions:
cA - A chooses to cooperate,
dA - A chooses to defect,
cB - B chooses to cooperate,
dB - B chooses to defect.
As in Section 2.6, ‘best :s’ denotes the proposition
the strategy associated with s gives the highest payoff for the corresponding player.
There will be two variants of the Rationality Assumptions RA’s: the minimal one for (i)
and (ii):
RA = {rA, rB},
and the maximal one for (iii):
RA = {rA, rB , KA(rB), KB(rA)}.
Game Description GD will be built step-by-step, with appropriate conclusions drawn at
the proper stages.
From the rules of the game, it follows that each of the players has to choose one strategy.
Let X be (cA∨dA) ∧ (cB∨dB). So by Assumption 2, we add the following to GD:
KA,B(X), KAKB(X), KBKA(X). (24)
It follows from the matrix of preferences that
cB → best :dA, dB → best :dA, cA → best :dB, dA → best :dB. (25)
Material implications here are quite appropriate since we want only to rule out certain
Boolean combinations of choices as not rational for a given player1.
1We do not use counterfactuals here since for rational players, the game is decided by the order of
preferences, which are mathematical facts about the game and do not seem to require a counterfactual
approach. For a comprehensive account of counterfactuals in game theory, see [16, 17].
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By Assumption 2, we add (25)–(29) to GD:
KA(cB → best :dA), KA(dB → best :dA), (26)
KBKA(cB → best :dA), KBKA(dB → best :dA). (27)
KB(cA → best :dB), KB(dA → best :dB), (28)
KAKB(cA → best :dB), KAKB(dA → best :dB). (29)
From (26) – (29), in epistemic logic Kr2 it follows that
KA[(cB∨dB)→ best :dA], KBKA[(cB∨dB)→ best :dA];
KB[(cA∨dA)→ best :dB], KAKB[(cA∨dA)→ best :dB].
Taking into account (24), we can conclude
KA(best :dA), KBKA(best :dA), KB(best :dB), KAKB(best :dB).
By the conditions of (i),
RA = {rA, rB}, (30)
we derive
rA ∧KA(best :dA), rB ∧KB(best :dB)
which, by Assumption 1, yields
dA and dB.
This proves (i).
To establish (ii), we have to show that neither KA(dB) nor KB(dA) can be derived
within the logical model of the game. We will show this using current assumptions (24)–
(30). Indeed, in Figure 2 there is a Kripke model in which (24)–(30) are true and both
KA(dB), KB(dA) are false at the root node
2.
•
u
dA, dB, rA, rB
cA, dB, rBdA, cB, rA
RBRA
•WW///////////
w•v GG
Figure 2: Kripke countermodel for KA(dB), KB(dA)
2An easy modification of this model covers the cases of major logics of knowledge S4 and S5 as well.
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There are three possible worlds in this model: u, v, and w, and two accessibility re-
lations, RA and RB, associated with modalities KA and KB such that uRAv and uRBw.
Atoms best :dA and best :dB hold at all nodes. All other atomic propositions hold as shown
in Figure 3. It is easy to see that Kr2 and (24)–(30) are true at u whereas both KA(dB) and
KB(dA) are false at u.
There is a clear epistemic reading of this model. The root node u represents the ‘real
world’ at which both players are rational, strategy ‘defect’ is the best rational choice for
each player, and both A, B play ‘defect.’ In addition, there is a consistent world v deemed
possible by A, at which B is not rational and chooses ‘cooperate.’ Likewise, B considers
possible a consistent world w at which A is not rational and chooses ‘cooperate.’
(iii) It takes mutual knowledge of rationality to make players’ choices and eventual
payoffs known to both players: let us extend the Rationality Assumptions to
RA = {rA, rB , KA(rB), KB(rA)}, (31)
and derive both KA(dB) and KB(dA). As noted earlier,
KBKA(best :dA) and KAKB(best :dB).
Together with (31), this yields
KB[rA ∧KA(best :dA)] and KA[rB ∧KB(best :dB)],
hence, by (5) and (22),
KB{[rA ∧KA(best :dA)] → dA} and KA{[rB ∧KB(best :dB)] → dB},
therefore
KB(dA) and KA(dB).
2
Note that in this paradigmatic game-theoretical scenario, our logic-based approach
provides a finer-grained analysis. We have established that, in addition to the minimal re-
quirements of mutual knowledge of game awareness, rationality alone suffices for the players
to know (and play) their Nash strategies. We have demonstrated that these epistemic as-
sumptions are, however, not sufficient for the players to know each other’s Nash strategies
and their own eventual payoffs; cross-knowledge of rationality is needed to achieve both.
These observations seem consistent with our intuition about this game, but within the
logical model, we are now able to rigorously establish these epistemic properties.
16
4 War and Peace Dilemma
Imagine two neighbouring countries: a big, powerful B with a history of expansion, and a
small country S which wants to remain independent. Each player has the choice to wage
war or to keep peace. The best outcome for both countries is peace. However, if both
countries wage war, then B wins easily and S loses everything, which is the second-best
outcome for B and the worst for S. In situation (warB, peaceS), B loses internationally,
which is the second-best outcome for S. In (peaceB,warS), B’s government loses its national
support, which is the worst outcome for B and the second worst for S.
warS peaceS
warB 2,0 ⇒ 1,2
⇑ ⇓
peaceB 0,1 ⇒ 3,3
There is one Nash equilibrium, (peaceB, peaceS), consisting of the best outcomes for
both players. It might look as though they should both play accordingly. However, such a
prediction is not well-founded unless certain epistemic conditions are met.
Theorem 2 In the War and Peace Dilemma, suppose game awareness is mutually known
and the players are rational. Then
i) S chooses ‘peace,’ but B does not necessarily choose ‘peace.’
ii) If, in addition, the rationality of S is known to B, then B chooses ‘peace’ as well.
However, S does not necessarily know that B chooses ‘peace.’
iii) If the rationality of players is mutually known, both players know that each chooses
‘peace.’
Proof.
For items (i)–(ii), the reasoning can be carried in a K-based logic of belief, whereas for (iii),
we will reason in a T-based logic of knowledge.
Let us begin with (i). Informally, only S has the dominant strategy, peaceS, whereas
B lacks one, hence the choice of B actually depends on B’s expectations of S’s move.
Let us analyze this game in the epistemic logic Kr2 with two modalities, KB and KS, and
propositions rB and rS for rationality assertions. We define propositions:
wB - B chooses to wage war,
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pB - B chooses to keep peace,
wS - S chooses to wage war,
pS - S chooses to keep peace.
For (i) we consider the Rationality Assumption
RA = {rB , rS}. (32)
As before, let X be (wB∨pB) ∧ (wS∨pS). By Assumption 2, we assign the following to
GD:
KB,S(X), KBKS(X), KSKB(X). (33)
It also follows from the rules of the game that given either wB or pB, the best choice
for S would be pS. By Assumption 2, the following is added to GD:
KS(wB → best :pS), KS(pB → best :pS), (34)
KBKS(wB → best :pS), KBKS(pB → best :pS). (35)
For B, the story is different, and the following should be added to GD:
KB(wS → best :wB), KB(pS → best :pB), (36)
KSKB(wS → best :wB), KSKB(pS → best :pB). (37)
From (34) and (35),
KS[(wB∨pB)→ best :pS], KBKS[(wB∨pB)→ best :pS],
and, by (33),
KS(best :pS), KBKS(best :pS).
By (32),
rS ∧KS(best :pS),
which, by (5) yields
pS.
To settle (i), we show that pB is not derivable from (32)–(37). This can be demonstrated
by constructing a Kripke model such that (32)–(37) hold, but KB(pB) does not hold at the
root node in this model. Such a model is given in Figure 33.
The model has two nodes u and v. Accessibility relation RS is empty and RB is such
that uRBv. One can see that (32)–(37) hold at u, but pB does not hold at u. An epistemic
reading of this model is that B deems possible a world v in which S is not rational and
chooses wS despite the fact that the best strategy for S is pS. Hence B does not know that
S chooses ‘peace’ and does not have to choose pB himself. This completes (i).
3The same model with modifications works for other major epistemic logics, e.g., S4 and S5.
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•
u
rB, rS, best :pB, best :pS, wB, pS
rB, best :wB, best :pS, wB, wS
RB
v•OO
Figure 3: Kripke countermodel for KB(pB)
(ii) We now extend the Rationality Assumption by adding the condition that B knows
that S is rational.
RA = {rB , rS , KB(rS )}. (38)
Together with earlier established KBKS(best :pS), this yields
KB[rS ∧KS(best :pS)].
From (5) and (22),
KB{rS → [KS(best :pS)→ pS]},
and, by reasoning in epistemic logic,
KB(pS).
From (33),
KB(best :pB),
and, from (38),
rB ∧KB(best :pB).
By (5),
pB.
We now verify that from (33)–(38), it does not follow that KS(pB), i.e., S still can be
unaware of B’s intension to play pB.
•
u
rB, rS, best :pB, best :pS, pB, pS
rS, best :pB, best :pS, wB, pS
RS
v•OO
Figure 4: Kripke countermodel for KS(pB)
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The corresponding Kripke model is given in Figure 44. Again, in this model, (33)–(38)
hold and KS(pB) does not hold at u. Informally, for S there is a possible world v in which
B is not rational and chooses wB despite the fact that B’s rational choice there is pB.
Hence S does not know pB.
(iii) Finally, we add the last remaining condition ‘S knows that B is rational’ to the
Rationality Assumption:
RA = {rB , rS , KB(rS ), KS(rB)}. (39)
Since we have already derived KB(pS), it remains to derive KS(pB).
It follows from the rules of the game that given pS, the choice wB is not the best one
for B and, by (22), it is known to S:
KS(pS → ¬best :wB). (40)
On the other hand, by Corollary 4,
KS[rB → (¬best :wB → ¬wB)]. (41)
Combining (40) and (41), we get
KS[rB → (pS → ¬wB)]
hence
KS[rB → (pS → pB)]
and
[KS(rB) ∧KS(pS)]→ KS(pB).
By (3), we add to GD
pS → KS(pS). (42)
Since pS holds, by (42),
KS(pS).
By (39), KS(rB) also holds and we derive the desired
KS(pB).
Note that the proof of (iii) above relies on Awareness Principle (8). An alternative
proof which does not rely on (8) is given in Theorem 3. 2
In the War and Peace Dilemma, our logical analysis shows that despite the fact that
a) for both countries, the best choice is ‘peace’;
4This model can be easily modified to cover S4 and S5 cases as well.
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b) it is the only Nash equilibrium in the game;
c) both countries behave rationally;
to secure the Nash equilibrium outcome, an additional epistemic condition should be met:
the big country should know that its small neighbour will behave rationally. Even this is
not good enough: to avoid unnecessary military expenses, the small country should know
that the big country will behave rationally and therefore will not wage war.
In the following section, we study general epistemic conditions under which players
know that each is playing his Nash strategy.
5 Nash equilibrium in strategic-form games
The following theorem shows that in strategic-form games, for any number of players
and strategies, epistemic conditions for Nash equilibria do not grow beyond the minimal
requirements of mutual knowledge of game awareness and mutual knowledge of rationality.
In particular, no common knowledge of rationality is necessary.
Theorem 3 Sufficient epistemic conditions, under which Nash equilibria in non-cooperative
strategic-form one-shot games is justified to all players, is mutual knowledge of both game
awareness and rationality of players. Knowledge properties required for players do not
exceed principles adopted for the logic T.
Proof. To simplify our reasoning, let us assume first that the game has a unique Nash
equilibrium and that for each player, all his payoffs are different. These assumptions place
the game inside the scope of Awareness Principle (8) and Corollary 3.
Informally, since the game is known, each player knows that each player’s rationality
rules out, given other players’ moves, all outcomes which do not yield the max payoff in
these conditions. The fact that these outcomes are ruled out is known to each player by
mutual knowledge of rationality. An outcome which survives this test yields max pay-
offs for each player, given other players’ moves, which is exactly the definition of a Nash
equilibrium.
Let ri stand for
player i is rational,
sji for
i-th player should choose strategy j,
best :sji for
strategy j yields the highest payoff for player i,
and ei for
player i should choose his Nash equilibrium strategy.
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In our logical model, the Rationality Assumption RA is
RA = {ri, Km(ri) | for all m, i = 1, 2, . . . , n}. (43)
Our goal is to demonstrate that in the logical model corresponding to the game,
K{1,2,...,n}(e1∧e2∧. . .∧en),
i.e., that Km(ei) for all m, i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}.
Lemma 1 Let j1, j2, . . . , jn be strategies for players 1, 2, . . . , n respectively such that for at
least one player m, strategy jm does not yield the highest payoff, given all other strategies
from j1, j2, . . . , jn. Then for all i = 1, 2, . . . , n,
Ki[¬(sj11 ∧sj22 ∧. . .∧sjnn )].
Proof. Without loss of generality, suppose the outcome j1, j2, . . . , jn is not optimal for
Player 1. Then
(sj22 ∧. . .∧sjnn ) → ¬best :sj11 (44)
follows from the rules of the game without any epistemic assumptions and, by Assumption 2,
Ki[(s
j2
2 ∧. . .∧sjnn ) → ¬best :sj11 ]. (45)
By Corollary 4,
Ki[r1 → (¬best :sj11 → ¬sj11 )]. (46)
Combining (45) and (46), we get
Ki[r1 → ¬(sj11 ∧sj22 ∧. . .∧sjnn )].
By (43),
Ki[¬(sj11 ∧sj22 ∧. . .∧sjnn )],
which completes the proof of Lemma 1.
This proof relies on Awareness Principle (8). We now present an alternative proof
of Lemma 1 which does not use (8) and is a more direct formalization of the usual game-
theoretical reasoning about strategic-form games. The solution uses reasoning about knowl-
edge of players after the game, when all the moves become known. The idea of the proof
is to establish that if a player knows before the game that he will know after the game that
a given choice of his own strategy is not rational, he is not going to play this strategy.
For each i = 1, 2, . . . , n, let K1i be an additional knowledge operator of player i after
the game is played (we say, at instant 1, meaning that instant 0 corresponds to the moment
of time just prior to the game)5. We assume some natural properties of K1i :
5Time-stamped knowledge modalities were considered, e.g., in [12].
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• Each K1i is a T-style modality, e.g., it is factive K1i (F ) → F , and this is known to
each player: for each m, i = 1, 2, . . . , n,
Km[K
1
i (F )→ F ]. (47)
• Knowledge does not disappear in time, and this is known to each player: for each
m, i = 1, 2, . . . , n,
Km[Ki(F )→ K1i (F )]. (48)
• Players know all moves after the game, and this is known to each player: for each
l,m, i = 1, 2, . . . , n,
Km[s
ji
i → K1l (sjii )] and Km[(¬sjii )→ K1l (¬sjii )]. (49)
Since (44) follows from the rules of the game, by Assumption 2,
KiK1[(s
j2
2 ∧. . .∧sjnn ) → ¬best :sj11 ]
and, by (48),
KiK
1
1[(s
j2
2 ∧. . .∧sjnn ) → ¬best :sj11 ] (50)
hence, by modal logic,
Ki[K
1
1(s
j2
2 ∧. . .∧sjnn ) → K11(¬best :sj11 )].
By (49) and modal logic,
Ki[(s
j2
2 ∧. . .∧sjnn ) → K11(sj22 ∧. . .∧sjnn )],
therefore
Ki[(s
j2
2 ∧. . .∧sjnn ) → K11(¬best :sj11 )].
By RA, player i knows that 1 is rational, Ki(r1), hence
Ki{(sj22 ∧. . .∧sjnn ) → [r1 ∧K11(¬best :sj11 )]}.
By an appropriate time-stamped version of Corollary 2 and Assumption 2,
Ki{[r1 ∧K11(¬best :sj11 )] → K11(¬sj11 )}
hence
Ki[(s
j2
2 ∧. . .∧sjnn ) → K11(¬sj11 )],
and, by (47),
Ki[(s
j2
2 ∧. . .∧sjnn ) → ¬sj11 ].
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By modal logic, this implies
Ki[¬(sj11 ∧sj22 ∧. . .∧sjnn )],
which completes the alternative proof of Lemma 1.
2
To complete the proof of Theorem 3, we notice that Ki[¬(sj11 ∧ sj22 ∧ . . .∧ sjnn )] for each
i = 1, 2, . . . , n and for each outcome j1, j2, . . . , jn which is not a Nash equilibrium. Since
each player knows a priori that one of the outcomes should occur, each player is left with the
knowledge that everyone had chosen his Nash equilibrium strategy: for each i = 1, 2, . . . , n,
K0i (e1∧e2∧. . .∧en).
If the game contains several Nash equilibria, each player knows the disjunction of out-
comes corresponding to Nash equilibria; this is as far as rationality alone can carry us.
If the game does not have Nash equilibrium in pure strategies, then mutual knowledge
of rationality rules out all possible outcomes as not rational for at least one of the players.
Here, rationality as a condition on pure strategies leads to an inconsistent set of assump-
tions. 2
The proof of Theorem 3 provides a non-circular epistemic justification of Nash equilib-
rium in strategic-form games. It may be regarded as an argument against the well-known
opinion that justification of Nash equilibrium strategies in strategic-form games requires
circular-style reasoning.
Aumann & Brandenburger’s 1995 paper [3] established that mutual knowledge of the
game and rationality, along with some other epistemic assumptions, is sufficient for Nash
equilibrium for mixed strategies; their proof is set-theoretical and uses partitions of state
space, which is usually associated with S5-style epistemic logic in the background with
positive and negative introspection principles required.
6 Epistemic analysis of Backward Induction
Figure 5 illustrates the centipede game suggested by Rosenthal, 1982, [15] and studied in
an epistemic context by Aumann, 1995 [2]. Player A makes moves at nodes 1, 3, and 5,
player B at nodes 2 and 4. Each player has the option of moving across or down, with
indicated payoffs
m
n
where the first component, m, is A’s payoff, and the second component, n, is the payoff for
B. The game starts at node 1.
The classic backward induction solution (BI) predicts playing down at each node. In-
deed, at node 5, player A’s rational choice is down. Player B is certainly aware of this
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1
•

1(A)
1
4
•

2(B)
//
4
3
•

3(A)
//
3
6
•

4(B)
//
6
5
•

5(A)
// // 5
8
//
Figure 5: Centipede game
and, anticipating A’s rationally playing down at 5, would himself play down at 4. Player A
understands this too, and would opt down at 3 seeking a better payoff, etc. The backward
induction solution is the unique Nash equilibrium of this game.
The question we try to address now is what are the epistemic conditions under which
rational players A and B know that they have to play down at each node. As usual,
we routinely assume mutual knowledge of game awareness and concentrate on tracking
knowledge of rationality. This is a well-known issue (cf. [2, 4, 5, 19]) and classical analysis
states that it takes common knowledge of players’ rationality (or, at least, as many levels
of knowledge as there are moves in the game) to justify BI.
In this chapter, we will try to revise this perception: we argue that the minimal as-
sumptions of mutual (first-level) knowledge of game awareness and rationality suffices for
intelligent players to justify backward induction in the centipede game in Figure 5, as well
as in any finite extensive-form game with perfect information.
6.1 Solution of the centipede game
We will devise a derivation in which the tower of knowledge operators does not pile up.
Theorem 4 In the centipede game, first-level mutual knowledge of game awareness and
rationality implies backward induction. Knowledge properties required for players do not
exceed principles adopted for the logic of knowledge T.
Proof. Let us first consider an informal solution. Imagine an intelligent player P ∈ {A,B}
who is perfectly capable of calculating the backward induction solution BI and payoff
function at each node. Then P proves a small theorem:
Rational players play BI. (51)
Indeed, P supposes otherwise, assumes that both A and B are rational, but that
someone would not play according to BI. P considers the latest node l at which
some player, X, would deviate from BI. This cannot be node 5, since BI is the
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only rational choice at 5. Moreover, l cannot be any other node either. Indeed,
by (9), X could deviate from BI at l only when X knows a better strategy
than BI, hence X knows that at some node after l, some of the players would
deviate from BI and therefore will not be rational. In any case, P figures that X
knows that some of the players are not rational, KX(¬rA) or KX(¬rB). From
this, P concludes ¬rA or ¬rB, which is impossible, since P assumes that both
A and B are rational.
Note that proving this theorem requires certain intellectual powers on the part of the
players, as well as being based on some generic properties of rationality and knowledge,
but it does not assume more than first-level knowledge of rationality. On the basis of (51),
A concludes that he should play down at 1.
Let us support this explanation by a formal logical derivation. We will be formalizing
the game in the basic logic of knowledge Tr2 for two knowers A and B. As before, KA, KB
will denote knowledge modalities, and rA, rB rationality assertions for players A and B
respectively.
We assume the mutual knowledge of game awareness, hence the situation is within the
scope of principles discussed in Section 2.
The Rationality Assumptions set here is
RA = {rA, rB , KA(rB), KB(rA)}. (52)
As before, the Game Description GD will be filled in step-by-step during the reasoning
process.
For each i = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, let propositions ai and di be
ai - the corresponding player would play ‘across’ at node i if a game starts at i,
di - the corresponding player would play ‘down’ at node i if a game starts at i.
At node 1, A knows that playing down would yield payoff 2, and playing across would
yield payoff 1 unless B plays across at node 2. If A is rational, then he would consider
playing across at 1 only if A knows that B would play across at 2. Hence the following
proposition follows from the game description and general understanding of rationality and,
by Awareness Principle (8) and Corollary 3, is added to GD:
rA → [a1→KA(a2)]. (53)
This principle states that in a perfect information environment, if a rational player chooses
a strategy, then he knows that it yields a better payoff than all other strategies.
From the factivity of KA, it follows that
rA → (a1→a2).
Likewise, if B is rational, then he would play across at 2 only if he knows that A would
play across at 3, since B otherwise could not possibly know a better strategy at 2 than
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playing down. Hence, by Awareness Principle (8) and Corollary 3, the following is added
to GD:
rB → [a2→KB(a3)] (54)
and, by factivity of KB,
rB → (a2→a3).
Repeating the same argument, we place on GD the following propositions, each of which
follows logically from the game rules and general understanding of rationality and knowl-
edge:
rA → [a3→KA(a4)], (55)
rB → [a4→KB(a5)], (56)
from which we derive
rA → (a3→a4) and rB → (a4→a5).
As follows from game description, at terminal node 5, player A, if rational, is not going to
play ‘across’ since he knows that he would receive a higher payoff by choosing ‘down.’ By
Assumption 2, we add the following to GD:
rA → ¬a5. (57)
In Boolean logic, from (53–57) we immediately derive
rA∧rB → ¬ai for all i=1–5.
From the rules of the game, it follows that
¬ai → di, (58)
which we also add to GD and conclude that
rA∧rB → di for all i=1–5.
By Assumption 2(ii), all of (53–58) and their aforementioned logical consequences are
known to both players. In particular, we add to GD
KA,B(rA∧rB → di) for all i=1–5. (59)
By epistemic modal logic,
KA,B(rA∧rB) → KA,B(di) for all i=1–5.
Since, by RA, KA,B(rA∧rB), we derive
KA,B(di) for all i=1–5,
which means that both players know that they should play backward induction strategy
at each node. 2
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6.2 Other PI games
It is quite clear how to generalize this proof to all extensive-form games with perfect
information.
Theorem 5 In extensive-form games with perfect information, first-level mutual knowl-
edge of rationality and game awareness for intelligent players implies backward induction.
Knowledge properties required for players do not exceed principles adopted for the logic of
knowledge T.
Proof. (Sketch). Similar to the proof of the centipede game from the previous section.
Informally, each of the intelligent players, say P , calculates the backward induction solution
BI and proves an unconditional lemma that
Rational players play BI at each node. (60)
To establish this, P assumes the opposite and considers the latest node l where some player,
call him X, would deviate from BI. P knows that l is not the last node, since P determines
that at terminal nodes, rational players would play BI. Moreover, l cannot be any other
node either since, by Awareness Principle (8) and Corollary 3, X could deviate from BI at l
only if X knows a better strategy than BI, hence X knows that at some node after l, some
of the players would deviate from BI and hence will not be rational. In any case, P figures
that X knows that some of the players are not rational. From this, P concludes that some
of the players are indeed not rational, which is impossible since P assumes rationality of
all players.
Using this lemma and P ’s knowledge of rationality of all players, P concludes that each
player plays BI. 2
Corollary 7 No common knowledge of the game and players’ rationality is needed to justify
backward induction. Moreover, the number of levels of mutual knowledge the players needed
here does not depend upon the length of the game and is equal to 1.
7 Discussion
7.1 Mutual knowledge vs. common knowledge of rationailty
Aumann’s 1995 paper [2] uses a set-theoretical model and establishes that “in PI games,
common knowledge of rationality implies backward induction.” Common knowledge of ra-
tionality (or its finite-nesting versions) have been widely adopted as an epistemic condition
for backward induction in PI games ([2, 4, 19]). Theorem 5 relaxes this restriction consid-
erably from common knowledge of rationality to first-level mutual knowledge of rationality.
As noted in [2], common knowledge of rationality is an idealized condition that is rarely
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met in practice. Mutual first-level knowledge of rationality is easier to imagine. In some
situations, it is plausible to assume that other players are intelligent rational agents who
are aware of the game rules. This looks to be a rather generic set of assumptions compared
to common knowledge of rationality, which presupposes players’ knowledge about all play-
ers’ rationality, all players’ knowledge of this knowledge, all players’ knowledge about all
players’ knowledge about this knowledge, etc.
It could be feasible to verify players’ intelligence and mutual knowledge of game aware-
ness, i.e., with some sort of certification from a trusted source. Verifying knowledge of ra-
tionality can be more problematic which is why, in this paper, we concentrated on tracking
knowledge of rationality and easing the assumption burden to a bare-minimum, first-level
mutual knowledge of rationality.
7.2 Required properties of knowledge
We also suggest easing requirements on knowledge principles. All of the epistemic reasoning
here can be performed at the level of the most general modal logic of belief K or logic of
knowledge T, assuming neither positive nor negative introspection, as well as in any other
normal modal logic of knowledge, e.g., S4, S5, etc.
7.3 What do we actually assume?
We offer a specific, logic-based approach. In our model, we try to accommodate the intellec-
tual powers of players who are considered not to be mere finite-automata payoff maximizers
but rather intellectual agents capable of analyzing the game and calculating payoffs condi-
tioned to the rational behavior of all players. However, we believe that such assumptions
about intellectual powers of players are within the realm of both: epistemic and game-
theoretical reasoning.
7.4 Comparing new and old solutions
It might appear that we are offering a trade-off of the complexity of assumptions (namely,
an unbounded number of levels of mutual knowledge of rationality) for the complexity
of reasoning. However, this is not the case. Our derivation of backward induction in
the centipede game of Section 6.1 is easier, since it does not require nested knowledge
considerations.
Another reasonable approach for monitoring the logical complexity of arguments in
epistemic reasoning has been offered by Justification Logic (cf. [1]), which tracks the
size and structure of evidence in epistemic derivations. Measuring the complexity of the
arguments and justifications may prove to be relevant since according to some epistemic
studies, trust in logical reasoning fades when the argument becomes too complex.
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7.5 Further plans
Here are some possible avenues of research for logic-based game-theoretical models.
• Epistemic analysis of specific games.
• Incorporating other Nash equilibria, including mixed strategies.
• Capturing the process of acquiring knowledge during games.
• Developing a mechanism of justification-tracking in game-theoretical reasoning. In-
troducing tools to control logical omniscience hidden in the Intelligence Theses.
• Modeling dependence of rationality on knowledge. Analyzing how knowledge can
help to win games.
• Incorporating other epistemic notions into the model.
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